Design and assessment of an efficient and equitable dynamic urban water tariff. Application to the city of Valencia, Spain by Lopez-Nicolas, A. et al.
This is a repository copy of Design and assessment of an efficient and equitable dynamic 
urban water tariff. Application to the city of Valencia, Spain.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/149619/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Lopez-Nicolas, A., Pulido-Velazquez, M., Rougé, C. et al. (2 more authors) (2018) Design 
and assessment of an efficient and equitable dynamic urban water tariff. Application to the 
city of Valencia, Spain. Environmental Modelling & Software, 101. pp. 137-145. ISSN 
1364-8152 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2017.12.018
Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
Design and assessment of an efficient and equitable dynamic 
urban water tariff. Application to the city of Valencia, Spain 
A. Lopez-Nicolás1*, M. Pulido-Velazquez1, C. Rougé2, J. J. Harou2 and A. Escriva-Bou3  
 1Research Institute of Water and Environmental Engineering (IIAMA), Universitat 
Politècnica de València, Camí de Vera s/n 46022 Valencia, Spain 
2School of Mechanical, Aerospace and Civil Engineering, The University of 
Manchester George Begg Building, Sackville Street, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK. 
3 Water Policy Center, Public Policy Institute of California, 500 Washington St Suite 
600, San Francisco, California, US 
* Corresponding author: A. Lopez-Nicolas (anloni@ upv.es +34 96 387 70 00 / Ext. 
76140) 
Abstract  
Water pricing policies have a large and still relatively untapped potential to foster more 
efficient management of water resources in scarcity situations. This work contributes a 
framework for designing equitable, financially stable and economically efficient urban 
water tariffs. A hydroeconomic simulation model links the marginal value of water, 
which reflects water scarcity given its competing uses, to water supply reservoir levels. 
Varying reservoir levels trigger variations in the second block of the proposed two-
block increasing-rate tariff; these variations then reflect water’s value at that time. The 
work contrasts the two-block scarcity tariff with a constant volumetric rate for the city 
of Valencia, Spain, and the drought-prone Jucar basin, where most of 430,000 
households are equipped with smart meters. Results show urban consumption is reduced 
by 18% in the driest years, lowering basin-wide scarcity costs by 34%. 
Keywords: dynamic tariff, urban water management, water pricing, marginal value of 
water, hydroeconomic modelling 
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1. Introduction  
Growing pressure on existing water resources from rising demand and uncertain supply 
underline the value of efficient management strategies. Although urban water 
conservation is often achieved through prescriptive regulation, the use of prices to 
manage water demand can be more cost effective than non-price conservation programs 
(Olmstead, 2009). The potential of water pricing to foster more efficient management of 
available water resources has been recognized in regulatory frameworks such as the EU 
Water Framework Directive (EC, 2000). This European regulation promote pricing as a 
way to pursue several objectives such as cost recovery for water suppliers, economic 
efficiency and environmental preservation by factoring in not only the financial but also 
the environmental and resource costs (Heinz et al., 2007; Pulido-Velazquez et al., 2008; 
Brouwer et al., 2009) .  
A pricing policy is economically efficient if the prices charged correspond to the total 
marginal cost of water (Rogers et al., 2002). In economic terms, efficient water 
management abides by the equimarginality principle, whereby the benefit forgone by 
allocating an additional unit of water to any consumer – also known as marginal 
resource opportunity cost (MROC),(Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2008 and 2013a; Macian-
Sorribes et al., 2015) – is the same regardless of the consumer. In lay terms, to achieve 
the greatest return from existing water resources a supplemental unit of water should be 
valued equally by different consumers. Yet, even though water pricing can in theory 
pursue several objectives at once including economic efficiency, its practical 
implementation can prove challenging because other objectives might have to 
considered for price design. This is the case for urban water rates that are expected to 
meet some basic functions (Hanemann, 1998; Griffin, 2006; Barberan and Arbues, 
2009). Cost recovery is a priority, as the selected tariff has to provide sufficient 
revenues to allow the utility to recover the cost of supply and meet its financial 
obligations, in both short-run and long-run conditions. Other objectives of urban water 
tariffs refer to the way costs should be allocated among consumers. Water rates should 
ideally be perceived as affordable, fair and equitable by the consumers. Finally, the 
proposed rates should be easily understood by clients and utilities and legally 
acceptable.  An example of residential urban tariff design that considers efficiency, 
equity, financial cost recovery, public acceptability and transparency is proposed by 
Garcia-Valiñas (2005). The method characterizes the urban water demand using an 
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econometric approach, and the costs of water supply through a Cobb-Douglas function. 
A variety of tariffs was then evaluated in terms of welfare effects, using the consumer 
surplus as indicator. The approach assessed economic efficiency and financial 
considerations but only at the consumer and utility levels, whereas the consequences of 
urban tariffs on consumption have repercussions on water availability and scarcity for 
all consumers in a river basin.  
Rate design is also constrained by the metering technology, which determines how 
regularly consumption can be measured. For instance, without water meters, customers 
are charged a fixed rate, which provides no incentive for consumers to know their 
consumption (Whittington et al., 2002). With ordinary meters, water can be charged at a 
volumetric rate. Flat rates can be efficient if well-designed (Garcia and Reynaud, 2004; 
Dige, 2013). Decreasing block rates, which lead to high volume consumers paying 
lower average water prices, has gradually fallen out of favor (Whittington et al., 2002). 
In contrast, increasing block rates (IBR) that penalize heavy consumers have become 
widely implemented, because they are seen as fairer and more economically efficient 
(e.g., Martins and Fortunato, 2007; Chen and Yang, 2009; Madhoo, 2011; Ward and 
Pulido-Velazquez, 2009). Yet, these merits of IBR have been questioned (Boland and 
Whittington, 2000; Strong and Goemans, 2014; Whittington et al, 2015), suggesting that 
when metering technology constrains rate design, pricing schemes may not always 
achieve their stated objectives. One option is seasonal IBR, that aims at reining in 
consumption during summer months in places where high summer use puts a strain both 
on scarce water resources and/or on the distribution infrastructure (e.g. Hoque and 
Wichelns, 2013; Molinos-Senante, 2014). New smart metering technologies, with their 
frequent and automated consumption measurements, enable dynamically varying tariffs, 
i.e., water pricing policies that changes over time. This includes seasonal pricing, but 
also peak-pricing strategies within a day (Rouge et al., in press). Sharing this 
information with customers could help manage residential demand (Rizzoli et al., 2014; 
Cardell-Oliver et al., 2016). Through real time information on water consumption, 
consumers can get learn about their water use and its associated cost, which has been 
shown to lower consumption (Gaudin, 2006; Strong and Goemans, 2015). Through real 
time information on water consumption, consumers know how much water they are 
using and how much they are going to pay, and how far are them from moving to the 
next block. Furthermore, prepayment water meters can be considered as a tool to 
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manage water resources that benefit both consumers and utilities. These water meters 
allow reducing financial and operational costs for the utilities; and allocating the 
resources more efficiently. However, their implementation could be difficult for low 
income consumers (Casarin and Nicollier, 2010). 
Scarcity pricing has its origin in the fact that, unlike in power networks, water 
distribution systems rely on largely climate-driven natural supplies. As water becomes 
scarce, its marginal value increases, and scarcity pricing aims to reflect this.  When the 
supply is abundant, this value is essentially zero and water price at the tap only reflects 
the treatment and delivery costs. When water becomes scarce, scarcity pricing adds the 
opportunity costs in the allocation of the scarce water to the price of water at the source 
that promotes an economically efficient allocation (Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2013a; 
Riegels et al. 2013 and Griffin 2006). This efficient scarcity price at source is the same 
for all other sectors, such as agriculture, industry, etc.  
However, water scarcity pricing has been very rarely implemented. In California, the 
2012-2016 drought spurred the implementation of economic tools such as drought 
surcharges and penalties to reduce residential water use. 29% of water utilities used 
drought surcharges (Mitchell et al, 2017): an increase in the unit price of water triggered 
by low water supply levels. During the same period, up to 79 % of utilities used 
penalties: fines charged to those that do violate water restrictions. These instruments 
have served to decrease water use while increasing revenues in periods when lower 
water use reduce revenues considerably, functioning as economic and financial tools at 
the same time. Mitchell et al. (2017) found that drought surcharges were significant in 
reducing per capita water use and complying with conservation targets. Previous studies 
have analysed the impacts of applying temporary drought pricing (e.g. Sahin et al. 2015 
and 2016) on urban systems. These pricing policies are only applied during drought 
periods, and the escalation of the baseline price schedule is based on the storage (price 
increased in a percentage with respect to the normal price, based on certain critical 
storage levels). But those prices are not linked to the marginal economic value of water 
in the system. 
In this paper we present a novel method for the design and assessment of economically 
efficient, equitable and financially-stable urban water rates considering a scarcity price, 
based on the estimation of water’s value at basin scale over time. Rates are dynamic in 
the sense that they vary every year according to the estimated marginal value of water, 
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which is linked to water scarcity and water demand. The urban water tariff is designed 
to transfer marginal water values at river basin scale to consumers, while considering 
the required conditions of urban water rates. As such, they are a first step towards 
exploiting the combined use of economic basinwide water resources assessment and 
urban smart metering technologies for designing economically efficient water tariffs. 
2. Methods 
2.1. General overview 
The proposed three-staged framework aims to design a dynamic urban water tariff 
considering the changing value of water (throughout the river basin and over time) for 
achieving more efficient water use. The first stage consists of obtaining a scarcity-based 
step pricing policy at river basin scale via use of time series of water value estimated 
throughout the basin. The second stage is the design of a baseline water tariff at 
consumer level taking into account the revenue sufficiency and equity criteria. Finally, 
the third stage is the dynamic urban water tariff using as a basis the scarcity-based 
pricing policy at river basin scale (stage 1) and the baseline water tariff at consumer 
level (stage 2).  An increase block rate has been chosen to design the dynamic urban 
water tariff. 
2.2. Marginal value of water at source 
The marginal value of water is used to get the scarcity-based water pricing policy. It can 
be estimated using hydro-economic models (HEMs) that use willing-to-pay estimates 
(‘demand curves’) for each water user within the water resource system. HEMs allow 
for an integrated analysis of water supply, demand and infrastructure management at 
basin scale (Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2008 and 2014; Harou et al. 2009; Heinz et al., 
2007; Bauer-Gottwein et al., 2016).  
In this work, time series of marginal value of water at different reservoirs in the system 
were determined through a priority-based simulation model that accurately reproduces 
complex system features, such as priorities in water allocation and system operating 
rules. The model was developed using the Decision Support System (DSS) SIMGAMS, 
a generic tool for developing hydroeconomic simulation models (Pulido-Velazquez et 
al., 2013b; Lopez-Nicolas, 2014) programmed in GAMS. The model solves a priority-
based simulation model that estimates water allocation on a monthly basis following 
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existing rules. Rules include targets for demands, storage, minimum environmental 
instream flows, etc., allocation priorities and reservoir operating rules (Fig.1). The 
model incorporates groundwater and stream-aquifer interaction, thus allowing 
conjunctive use simulation. The river basin must be characterized in terms of topology 
of the flow network, available infrastructure, hydrology, stream-aquifer interaction and 
economic data. HydraPlatform (Knox et al., 2015) and Microsoft Excel were used as 
auxiliary tools for pre-processing all the data. HydraPlatform is an open-source software 
platform for network (node-link) model that allows input, storage, display and export 
model data, including the connectivity matrix of the system (which represents the 
relations between nodes and links).  
 
Figure 1. General flowchart to estimate time series of water´s value at river basin scale 
The main results are allocation decisions such as storages or deliveries, and economic 
results such as water scarcity cost and the value of water at selected surface reservoirs. 
SIMGAMS also evaluates the associated water scarcity cost for each consumer of the 
system through the economic demand functions that relate the quantity of water 
consumed to its marginal value. 
From the baseline simulation run, the value of water at a given date t and a given 
specific reservoir node is obtained by the following procedure (Pulido-Velazquez et al., 
2008 and 2013a): 
x Step1: addition of a small quantity of water at this date and reservoir.  
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x Step 2: simulation of the system from t onwards with this additional water; the 
initial condition at t is exactly the same as the situation at that date in the 
baseline run. 
x Step 3: the marginal value of water at the date and node is approximated by the 
change in benefit with respect to the baseline scenario due to the extra water 
resources, divided by the marginal increase of the resource. 
Time series of marginal water values are obtained by iterating this procedure for all 
monthly time steps of the simulation, for all the reservoirs for which they must be 
obtained. 
2.3 Stage 1: scarcity-based step pricing policy at river basin scale  
The scarcity-based water pricing policy at river basin level will be obtained through the 
time series of marginal water values (referred to hereafter simply as ´water value´). 
Then, the impacts of this pricing policy will be evaluated at river basin scale in order to 
verify its effectiveness. 
The water values, which have been obtained through the simulation DSS tool 
SIMGAMS (section 2.2), are used to design the efficient scarcity-based step pricing 
function, which defines a price of water associated to a storage range in reservoirs. This 
procedure follows the following subsequent steps (Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2013a): 
o To plot water values as a function of the storage for each time step. 
o To lump the values in different groups using as thresholds predefined 
storage levels.  
o To obtain the scarcity-based step pricing policy based on the average 
value for each group.  
The rationale behind this method is that high levels of water storage reflect low water 
scarcity, and therefore a low value of water. Consumers are assumed to react to price 
changes according to microeconomic theory. The change in water use due to a price 
change will be given by the corresponding economic demand function for each 
consumer (Fig. 2). When water reserves in the system are scarce, a high price will lead 
to a reduction in the target demand for each use (Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2013a). The 
effectiveness of the scarcity-based step pricing function can be quantified in terms of 
reduction of the water scarcity cost. 
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Each scarcity price corresponds to a target reduction of water use with respect to the 
initial target demand—which is the base water use without any price intervention. 
Scarcity price and target reduction are linked by the price elasticity of demand.  
Ultimately, reservoir levels and associated water values, determined at basin level, are 
linked with scarcity pricing and target reductions at the water consumer level as we 
describe in section 2.5, for achieving a more efficient use of water. 
 
 
Figure 2. Economic demand function showing willingness to pay as a function of water use 
2.4 Stage 2: dynamic increasing block urban tariff. Design of the baseline 
We assume a simple two-tier increasing block price structure. The tariff should fulfill 
the objectives of revenue sufficiency (cost recovery) and equity, in addition to economic 
efficiency. According to the revenue sufficiency criterion, the revenues, R (M. € / year), 
should be equal to the summation of costs for each source of water for urban supply, Cs 
(M. € / year):  
  ܴ = σ ܥ ௦                                                                            ௠௦ୀଵ [1] 
In the two-block tariff, the revenue is given by: 
              R= ߣଵ ή σ ௜ܸ + ߣଶ ή σ ௝ܸ + ܨܫ଺௝ୀଵ଺௜ୀଵ                                            [2] ߣଵ is the marginal price for the first block (€/m3) and ߣଶ is the marginal price for the 
second block (€/m3), FI is the revenue from fixed charges (M.€ / year) due to service 
and maintenance services; and  Vi and Vj are the supplied volume of water for the first 
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and the second block respectively (m3/bi-monthly). The cost for each source is 
expressed as: 
             ܥ௦ = ܨܥ + σ ௏೔ா ή ܸܥ                                                       [3] 
Where s represents each water source, FC are the fixed costs (M. €/ year), E is the 
efficiency parameter of the distribution network that defines the water losses from each 
source, and VC represents the variable costs associated with water treatment and 
distribution (€/m3). Substituting equations 2 and 3 into equation 1 and assuming the 
value of  ߣଵ ,(considering expert consultation), the value of ߣଶ can be obtained. 
The second block penalizes large uses, especially during water scarcity periods, and 
therefore uses water pricing to enhance water use efficiency and promote water 
conservation. As a result, the first block improves equity among consumers in the sense 
that large consumers subsidize the basic uses for everybody with their second-block 
payments as the water tariff for the first block will remain constant even during scarcity 
situations. 
2.5 Stage 3: dynamic increasing-block urban tariff. Design of the dynamic component 
The second block is designed to achieve the economic efficiency target by transferring 
the impact of the step scarcity-based pricing function at river basin level (stage 1) to the 
consumer´s level, assessing the demand reductions with respect to the initial target 
demand.  
The charges for each block coming from stage 2 and the percentages of demand 
reductions, with respect to the baseline target demand (section 2.3), are the basis for 
developing the new dynamic urban water tariff. This IBR will be dynamic, since the 
volumetric rate will depend on the storage available in the main reservoirs for each year, 
used as a proxy of water scarcity in the basin, as the scarcity price depends on the 
storage (section 2.3).As a result, consumers get to know those prices beforehand, and 
react accordingly. The rate of the first block remains constant due to equity conditions, 
whilst for the second block each water rate will be obtained as the minimum price of 
water that allows achieving the reductions of the demand that come from the river basin 
level analysis.      
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3. Case study and material  
3.1. Water supply to the city of Valencia from the Jucar river  
The case study is the supply to the city of Valencia from the Jucar river system, a 
complex water resources system located in Eastern Spain within the Jucar river district 
(Fig. 3). 
 
Figure 3. Jucar river district / Jucar river basin 
The Jucar river system is the largest part of that water resources district (22378 km2), 
and comprises the Jucar river basin and the area supplied by the Jucar-Turia canal. The 
basin is highly regulated, and almost 84% of its water supply is consumed for crop 
irrigation, and 13 % goes to urban use. Water demand totals 1397 Mm3/year, whilst the 
average water resources availability is estimated as 1517 Mm3/year from 1940/41 to 
2011/12 (CHJ, 2015a). The municipality of Valencia receives water from two water 
treatment plants, “La Presa” and “El Realón” (45 % and 55 % of the total demand 
respectively) and from 2 main sources: the Jucar river (through the Jucar-Turia canal for 
inter-basin transfer; 75% of the supply on average) and the Turia river (25%) (CHJ, 
2015a).  
3.2. Hydroeconomic simulation model of the Jucar river system 
The Jucar river model has been developed using as main sources the data from the Jucar 
river basin agency and previous studies and simulation models of the Jucar basin 
developed using SIMGES (Andreu et al. 1996), applied in the development of the river 
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basin management plan of the Jucar district (CHJ, 2015a). The schematic of the model’s 
network is shown in Fig. 2 in supplementary material. 
The main reservoirs of the basin are Alarcon (1112 Mm3 of capacity), Contreras (440 
Mm3 of useful capacity, 852 Mm3 of total capacity) and Tous (378 Mm3 of useful 
capacity). Alarcon and Contreras are located in parallel in the upper basin, whilst Tous 
is located downstream. The Jucar river basin agency sets the system operating rules 
considering Alarcon and Contreras as the main over-year storage facilities. Tous 
reservoir is mainly used for flood control and for regulation during the irrigation season. 
The most important irrigation infrastructures are the Jucar-Turia and the Acequia Real 
canals. The Jucar-Turia canal delivers water to the metropolitan area of Valencia and to 
the city of Sagunto, and to the Jucar-Turia irrigation district. The Acequia-Real canal 
supplies water to the Ribera Alta irrigation district in the lower basin, mainly for rice 
crops and fruit trees, such as oranges and persimmon. The main gross urban demands 
are Valencia (74.3 Mm3/year, (70 % corresponds to residential uses; Ayuntamiento de 
Valencia, 2014)), Albacete (13.3 Mm3/year), Sagunto (8.8 Mm3/year), and Mancha-
Manchuela (10.9 Mm3/year). 
The exploitation of the Eastern Mancha aquifer (in the upper basin) is one of the key 
management challenges in the basin (CHJ, 2015b), since the increase in groundwater 
abstractions has inverted stream-aquifer interaction, moving from a winning to a losing 
river. The model allocates water based on the current priorities and operating rules for 
the 2012 water demands.  
3.3. Urban water supply in the city of Valencia 
The city of Valencia has around 800,000 inhabitants, and most of the 430,000 
households are equipped with smart water meters, making the implementation of a 
dynamic scarcity tariff feasible. Table 1 shows the distribution of households per block 
water rate under the current IBR tariff. More than 30% of the clients have a low 
consumption (between 0 and 8 m3/2 months). The distribution of the type of meters, 
according to the diameter, is needed for assessing the total fixed cost. 97.5% are less 
than 15 mm and 1.75% is 20 mm; the remaining 0.75% is over 20 mm (EMIVASA, 
2016). 
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Table 1. Percentage of households per block tariff (Source: EMIVASA,2016) 
Percentage of households per block tariff 
Consumption (m3/2 months) % 
0 - 8 37.65 
8- 12 18.65 
12 - 25 33.98 
25 - 40 7.28 
> 40 2.44 
Using an econometric approach, Garcia-Valiñas (2004; 2006) obtained a price-elasticity 
of demand of -0.64 for the city of Valencia. The urban water demand, excluding urban 
municipal and agricultural uses, was estimated using a log-linear functional form. With 
the average annual per capita volume of water (m3) as independent variable, the model 
incorporates the following explanatory variables: price (average cost in euros), revenue 
per capita (in euros), percentage of single-family homes, percentage of vacation homes, 
a binary variable to identify coastal homes, and two variables for identifying industrial 
and tourism activities. 
The point expansion method (Jenkins et al., 2003) has been used to extrapolate this 
price-elasticity estimate to compute the consumers’ response to different water tariffs. It 
uses a Cobb-Douglas function with constant price elasticity (See Fig. 3 in 
supplementary material for the economic function of Valencia). 
4. Results  
4.1 Water values and scarcity-based step pricing policy 
In order to get the step scarcity-based water pricing policy, the marginal value of water 
is estimated at the Tous reservoir considering the total storage in the 3 main surface 
reservoirs of the system (Alarcon, Contreras and Tous reservoirs). Although the main 
carryover storage is kept in the 2 main upstream reservoirs, Tous is the reservoir from 
which surface water is derived for the main demands of the basin. 
Figure 4 shows the time series of Tous reservoir marginal value of water versus the total 
storage. As expected, it increases when the storage get lower, and is maximal during the 
drought periods (e.g. from 2005 to 2008). 
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Figure 4. Marginal value of water vs total storage (Alarcon, Contreras and Tous reservoirs) 
The annual scarcity-based step pricing function of the Jucar river basin has been 
obtained considering estimated water value at Tous vs. the total storage of Alarcon, 
Contreras and Tous reservoirs. The storage represented corresponds to the beginning of 
May, since 1) by then most of the rainfall of the hydrologic year has occurred, and 2) is 
the starting of the irrigation season. Therefore, May storage represents the available 
volume at the beginning of the most critical period of water supply within the year. The 
water value at May 1st is obtained as the average value for the corresponding 
hydrological year. The storage thresholds for defining each step of the pricing schedule 
were set as 160, 367 and 507 Mm3 respectively (Fig.5). The final step-pricing function 
was defined by taking the mean of the annually averaged marginal water values at each 
of the 4 storage intervals (Fig.5).   
 
Figure 5.  Scarcity-based step pricing function at the Jucar river basin 
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4.2 Impact of the step scarcity-based pricing policy 
Once the scarcity-based step pricing function has been obtained, the next step is to 
evaluate the impact of this water pricing policy at river basin scale by using the DSS 
SIMGAMS. 
Figure 6 shows the water scarcity cost in the historical drought periods for both the 
baseline scenario (without pricing policies) and the scarcity-based water pricing policy 
scenario. The results demonstrate the benefit of applying this step water pricing policy 
for all the competing consumers, with a significant reduction of the water scarcity cost 
when applying these policies (34 % during the latest drought period).  
 
Figure 6. Impacts of scarcity-based water pricing policy at river basin scale 
Once we had simulated the economic efficiency of the scarcity pricing at river basin 
scale, we calculated the reduction of the demand, with respect to the target demand, for 
the urban supply of the city of Valencia using its economic function and the scarcity 
pricing function. The reductions of the annual target demand are 18 %, 8% and 3 % for 
a scarcity price of 0.35 €/m3, 0.14 €/m3 and 0.04 €/m3 respectively. These values are 
used for developing the dynamic component of the urban water tariff. 
4.3 Baseline component of the urban water tariff 
The baseline water tariff has been designed with an equity objective (large volume 
consumers are subsidizing other consumers’ basic uses though the 2-tier price 
schedule), as well as with the condition of revenue sufficiency for the utility that 
provide the service (equations 1, 2 and 3). So, we assess the total cost (fixed and 
variable components) and the fixed component of the revenues in order to obtain the 
water rate for each block. With respect to the cost, the total cost has been estimated as 
72.14 M. €/year, with a volumetric variable cost of 0.472 €/ m3, using data provided by 
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the Valencia water utility (EMIVASA, 2016) and the official water rates for 2016 
(DOCV, 2015).  With respect to the revenue, the total fixed revenue per year has been 
estimated as 47.91 M. €/ year, using the percentage of households per block tariff (Fig. 
1 in supplementary material), the distribution of clients per type of meter (EMIVASA, 
2016) and the official water rates for 2016 (DOCV, 2015) . So, WKHYDOXHVRIȜ1b and Ȝ2b 
can be obtained by substituting these data into equations 1, 2 and 3. 
The baseline water rate has been obtained by maintaining the official current rate for the 
1st block, Ȝ1b, at 0.44 €/m3, and applying equation 2 to obtain a value of Ȝ2b of 0.56 €/m3 
for the second block. In this way, the threshold for the first block, 12 m3, has been set 
based on the basic quantity of water that people need for survival in healthy conditions. 
According to the World Health Organization 100 l/day/person (Howard and Bartram, 
2003) is a minimum requirement of per capita water use. Moreover, 60 % of the 
households have 2 or less persons. Thus, the consumption for households of 2 persons 
corresponds to 12 m3 per 2 months. 
4.4 Dynamic component  
The dynamic urban water tariff is designed with 2 blocks. The rate of the first block 
remains the same based on the equity conditions, whilst the rate of the second block 
depends on the storage, as explained in section 2.5. So, the dynamic urban water tariff 
for the city of Valencia consists of 4 different rates for the second block, as the step 
scarcity-based pricing policy for the Jucar river basin has 4 different possibilities. These 
rates have been calculated considering the demand reductions during scarcity periods, 
using the economic demand function for the city of Valencia and the scarcity-based 
pricing policy at the Jucar river basin scale (see table 2). In this way, we link the impact 
of scarcity-based water pricing policy at river basin level with water tariffs at 
consumer’s level. 
Table 2. Dynamic urban water tariff 
Water value 
(€/m3) 
Ȝ1 
(€/m3) 
Ȝ2  
(€/m3) % Annual demand reductions 
0.35 0.44 0.78 18% 
0.14 0.44 0.66 8% 
0.04 0.44 0.60 3% 
0 0.44 0.56 - 
Then, we test the impact of the dynamic urban water tariff considering the historical 
storage time series (from 1980 to 2012). Figure 7 shows the annual demand reductions 
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(%) versus the total storage at May 1st, the highest demand reductions are obtained as 
expected during drought periods. Demand reductions from pricing applied early in 
drought periods increase the availability of water resources later on. 
  
Figure 7. Demand reductions from applying the dynamic urban water tariff  
Table 3 shows the revenue coming from the fixed and variable rate structure of the 
dynamic water tariff. The results show that certain extra revenue (up to 1% of the 
annual revenue in the baseline conditions) is expected in those years in which scarcity 
pricing is applied. 
Table 3. Fixed and variable revenue components of the dynamic urban water tariff 
Ȝ2 (€/m3) Fixed 
Revenue 
(M. € / year) 
Variable Revenue  
(M. € / year) 
Total Revenue 
(M.€ / year) 
Increased revenue 
(M.€ / year) 
0.78 47.91 24.95 72.86 0.72 
0.66 47.91 25.00 72.91 0.77 
0.60 47.91 24.61 72.52 0.38 
0.56 
(baseline) 
47.91 24.23 72.14 -  
 
We have analysed a hypothetical scenario considering a price elasticity of the demand 
of -0.4 instead of -0.64. We have tested the benefit of applying the step water pricing 
policy for all the competing consumers, considering the -0.4 price elastic of demand for 
urban consumers, obtaining also a significant reduction of water scarcity cost at river 
basin scale (20 % during the latest drought period). Finally, the annual percentage of 
urban demand reduction ranges from 1.7 to 11 %, percentages lower than those in table 
2 obtained for a price-elasticity of  -0.64, as expected.  
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
The proposed framework enables the design of a dynamic water tariff considering the 
role of water pricing as a tool for efficient management of water demand during scarcity 
periods. This is done by integrating a scarcity price component in the rate without 
modifying the reduced price considered for equity reasons and keeping the revenue 
sufficiency condition. A hydroeconomic simulation model of the river basin is used to 
estimate the changing marginal value of water at river basin scale. This requires 
estimated economic demand curves for water consumers throughout the basin and 
assessing the costs of water service for water utilities and characterising the supply (e.g., 
number of blocks or household distributions per block rate). The proposed scarcity-
based pricing policy sends a scarcity signal to water users because the price varies with 
water availability. 
A dynamic water tariff considers the economic value of the resource when water is 
scarce thereby promoting efficient water use by moderating consumption. This requires 
the ability to measure consumption accurately over well-defined periods. New smart 
meter technologies allow utilities to track consumption remotely and accurately over 
specific time-periods (e.g. Cominola et al., 2016). The case study is the urban water 
supply to the city of Valencia, which is almost fully equipped with smart meters where 
volumetric consumption is charged on a bimonthly basis but where prices do not 
currently vary over time. The dynamic water tariff is set for each year, since the Jucar 
river basin suffers from multiyear droughts. Although dynamic pricing could be applied 
to shorter periods, we choose to demonstrate the concept in a way a less removed from 
current practice as possible.  Changing tariffs once a year in our case enables substantial 
efficiency gains whilst minimising little regulatory change and business planning 
changes for water users.  Because May storage levels are representative of water 
availability that year (at the beginning of the irrigation season and little further rain is 
expected), it acts as a good proxy of water scarcity in the basin.  
The dynamic water tariff sends water consumers a water scarcity signal via the increase 
of water price for the second block (the initial price for low consuming users is kept 
constant for equity reasons), ranging from 0.60 €/ m3 to 0.78 €/m3 when the scarcity 
price of water is considered (the baseline rate is 0.56 €/m3). Higher water rates allow 
reducing water use between 3 % and 18 % during scarcity situations (according to our 
18 
 
estimate price-elasticity of demand). Despite the reduction in water use, there will be an 
increase in utility revenue from 0.38 to 0.72 M €/ year, due to the higher water rates. So, 
a high water price could soft the expected revenue decrease due to the demand 
reductions. This is consistent with the findings in the international literature. For 
example, Sahin et al. 2016 found that temporary drought pricing would generate 
additional revenues in the case study of the Australia´s populated South-east 
Queensland region than can fund water supply infrastructures. Furthermore, Garcia-
Valiñas 2005 found that the proposed optimal water tariffs, based on Ramsey (1927) 
and Feldstein (1972) theories, lead to welfare improvements, using Seville as case 
study. 
The excess revenue generated during the scarcity periods (partially compensated by a 
lower demand) could generate additional resources for increasing water security 
investments. Since urban tariffs are usually designed for revenue neutrality for the 
utility, the additional revenue could be assigned to either increase the security of urban 
water supply (e.g. reducing leakage) or to investments that promote a more efficient and 
sustainable use of water in the basin, and in that case the extra revenue could be 
managed by the river basin authority.  
There is also a significant uncertainty on the average behaviour of the users for scarcity 
pricing (prices higher than the current prices based on the reliability of the price 
elasticity estimate). Nevertheless, we would like to highlight that higher water tariffs 
during water scarcity periods provide an incentive for reducing water use with respect to 
initial target demands. This is evaluated by assessing the impact of scarcity pricing on 
the demand of water through the economic demand functions for each consumer. 
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